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In

th~ Supr~m~
Stat~

Court of th~
of Utah

RALPH E. CHILD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF E M P L 0 Y M E N T SECURITY,
Defendant.

CASE
NO. 8873

Brief of Appellant, Ralph E. Child
STATEMENT OF FACTS
That the appellant, Ralph E. Child, has complied with each and every requirement pertinent
to eligibility, as written in Section 35-4-4, Utah
Code Annotated.
The appellant is an office.r of the Ralph Child
Construction Company and has been since the
formation of that construction company on or about
April 1, 1956, his office and title being that of
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President and Director. The corporation has five
officers, all of whom served in a policy making
capacity and for such service received no pay, at
least until the time of this hearing, it being the
decision of the Board of Directors that no pay
would be paid but that their compensation would
be received temporarily on the basis of stock appreciation. The Board of Directors then consisted of
three officers of the company, to-wit: Ralph E.
Child as President, Earl Child as Vice President,
and Lois Child as Secretary. It was the function of
these officers to serve and carry out the formal requirements of the corporation, for which they
would receive a nominal sum commensurate with
their activity. The physical operation of the
company was delegated to a Manager and
Superintendent and in that respect the Board
of Directors and officers retained the services
of Ralph E. Child in the capacity of Manager
and supervisor, for which he was to receive a weekly wage in the amount of $165.00. The corporation
began to function along the lines set forth in the
purpose clause of its Articles, to-wit: as a general
contractor, and the duties of managing and directing the affairs of the company, except for the formal requirements, fell upon the manager and supervisor, Ralph E. Child. The company functioned normally until about May of 1957, when work became
slack and the corporation '"as without funds. At
this time they still employed Ralph E. Child as
manager and supervisor to clean up the work of the
corporation that had been incurred and to accu1nuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
late the company's assets, such as equipment, etc.,
and to complete such work as was still remaining
to be done. However, there was no money received
and the corporation was, for practical purposes, insolvent. That being the circumstances, the company
paid Mr. Child by check, it being his understanding
and instruction that he could not cash the checks
until the corporation had moneys in the bank to
cover them. This status continued until approximately December of 1957, at which time it was determined by the Board of Directors of the corporation that the con1pany must reduce its overhead and
eliminate all help not absolutely necessary, and,
therefore, discharge Ralph E. Child as manager
and superintendent. The only functions that were
left in the company were those small ministerial
matters that normally befall a president and executive officers of the corporation. The active function of the corporation for the purpose for which it
was designed were terminated. During all the times
in which the corporation was organized and functioning and during all of the times that Ralph E.
Child was employed as manager and supervisor for
the corporation, unemployment compensation was
paid by the corporation upon his salary as manager
and supervisor. This was required of the corporation by law and the corporation felt duly obligated
to pay it inasmuch as its attitude toward Ralph E.
Child was one of employer-employee relationship.
No objection was ever made by the Industrial Commission to the receipt of these moneys and no protest was made by Ralph E. Child or the corporation

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

as to his capacity as an employee of that company,
as distinguished from an officer or director.
It should be noted that during the year 1956
and 1957 the company did substantial work and
paid substantial salaries and wages to its employees
and that the work and duties of the manager and
supervisor were extensive, but that the obligations
of the president and director were relatively constant during the years 1956-1957 and 1958. That
the Board of Directors and officers of the corporation have functioned in approximately the same
capacity during all of the time the corporation has
been organized, but that the work of the employees
of the corporation has varied directly with the
work available. That on or about December 26,
1957, the appellant, Ralph E. Child, filed his claim
with the Industrial Commission for unemployment
compensation because of his discharge and termination as manager and supervisor of the Ralph Child
Construction Company. That the matter was reviewed by a referee for the Industrial Commission
who rejected the claim of the appellant, whereupon
the appellant appealed to the Board of Reviews for
a review which affirmed the decision of the referee
and rejected the appellant's claim. Whereupon the
appellant directed this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT 1
That Ralph E. Child, as manager and supervisor of the Ralph Child Construction Company,
was an employee within the meaning of the Unemployment Con1pensation Act and was entitled to
unemployment compensation upon his termination
and discharge as manager and supervisor.
ARGUMENT

The findings of the appeals referee and the
Board of Review have put great emphasis upon the
fact that Ralph E. Child served in a dual capacity,
to-wit: President and director, and as manager and
supervisor. The Board of Review has consented the
fact that the president of the corporation still has
fun~tions to perform as it being a factor prohibits
Ralph E. Child, he being the same person, from receiving unemployment compensation. Both of these
bodies have overlooked and failed to distinguish
between the functions and duties of a manager and
the functions and duties of a president and director of a corporation. The Court well knows that
these responsibilities are not the same. The court
is invited to take judicial knowledg·e of the fact
that officers and directors of corporations often assume only nominal responsibilities of policy making
and ministerial nature, for which they receive, in
many cases only a nominal salary. This is the usual
case and the president and dire~tor is ordinarily
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required in small corporations only to perform
those formal duties that are required, such as
signing the contracts, and performing the formal
legal obligations of the corporation. In other words,
it is a common practice for the president of the
corporation to function in those capacities that
have legal significance in respect to the corporation's relationship to other persons or corporations.
This is distinguished from the responsibilities of
the manager of the corporation who is charged
with the responsibility of the actual active conduct
of the corporation for the purposes for which it
was organized. The court is invited to consider as
an analogy the relationship between the president
and board of directors of the usual banking establishment. No one would contend that in a banking
organization the manager could also be an officer
and director and still be discharged as manager or
replaced and be allowed to maintain his president
and directorship in the said banking organization.
I call this to the Court's attention because I can
think of numerous examples in the small banking
organizations of the State of Utah, with which I
am acquainted. Furthermore, the responsibilities
of a manager and a president of a corporation are
grossly different. When the reasons for which the
manager was hired ceased to exist, it is only
natural and proper that he be discharged and it is
the responsibility of the officers and directors to
see that this is done. They are charged by law with
this responsibility, for it is their duty to maintain
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the assets of the corporation and protect the rights
of the stockholders.
No exception should be taken to the fact
that one person served in a dual capacity. The
very existence of a corporation anticipates this relationship. The corporation itself is nothing more
than an artificial person and can function only
through human beings. No one would contend that
the president of a corporation cannot be in two
capacities, one individually for himself as a human
being and one on behalf of the corporation. If that
is so, is there any more reason for the court or the
referee or the board of review to conclude that he
cannot serve in three capacities, one as a human
being, two as the president of a corporation, and
three as a manager of the corporation, each capacity being separate and distinct.
Let us consider the effect of the board of review's decision. The only way that an employee,
who is also an officer, can recover unemployment
compensation would be, under the circumstance
wherein the corporation was dissolved. If he had
any fun~tion to perform at all in his capacity as
an officer or director of the corporation, he would,
within the decision of the referee and the board
of review, still be employed and, therefore, not entitled to compensation, but the decision of the board
of review and the referee in this case s,eems to be a
one -vvay street. They want to include Ralph E. Child
as an employee as distinguished from the president
and director when collecting unemployment cmn-
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pensation insurance, but want to consider him as
employed as president and director as distinguished from manager when ruling upon his right
for unemployment compensation. I could find no
cases directly in point on this particular subject
matter, although there are numerous cases wherein
it has been cited that an officer may also be an employee within the meaning of the act. For example:
"In the case of the State ex rei Murphy vs.
Welch, it was held that the President and Vice
President for a corporation who worked in the
company's store and received weekly wages
were rightfully counted as 'employees' in determining whether the company had the number
of employees necessary to come under the unemployment compensation act,"
State ex rei Murphy vs. Welch
187 Okla. 470 103 P2d 533
This case is almost exactly in point in respect to
the relationship of the officers and directors of the
company. In that case the officers also worked as
employees for a wage, the same as the officers did
in this particular case. It would seem that if an
officer is an employee for one purpose he is an
employee for another purpose and that purpose being to receive unemployment compensation. To consider this case above cited in the light of the board
of review and the referee's decision would mean
that the only ·time the company's store clerks could
receive unemployment compensation in Oklahoma
if they were officers would be \Yhen the corporation
was dissolved. I cannot believe that that was the
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interpretation of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The
functions of the Unemployment act should be reciprocal and it should be a two way street.
Another case that might be analogous, but not
directly in point is the case of Ii Re: Lishner. This
is a New York case in which the claimant was the
owner of 50rc of the capital stock of a business corporation which wholly owned a summer resort
hotel. He worked for the summer resort hotel as
manager. The New York Court denied his right to
recover unemployment compensation because the
activity he was engaged in was a seasonal activity
and seasonal activities are not covered by unemployment compensation. However, no objection was
made to his claim for compensation on the basis
that he was not an employee within the meaning of
the act, or that he was not unemployed within the
meaning of the act. It seems in the New York case
that the mere fact that he was a stockholder and
officer of the corporation did not prevent him from
being unemployed as an employee of the corporation and the only reason in that case for which
recovery was denied was because he was engaged
in a seasonal occupation for which coverage was
not allowed. This seems by anology to be in point
In Re: Leshner 268 Appellant Division 582, 52 New
York Supplement 2d 587 and an annotation may be
found in 24 ALR 2d 1401.
As I mentioned, there are not many cases on
this subject matter, although I do not claim to be
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an expert in legal research. I do find in 48 AMJ
Page 524 at Section 16, some interesting comments
that indicate that a person may serve in a dual
capacity for the purpose of paying unemployment
compensation insuran0e. There seems to be no case,
either in AMJ or ALR or in the annotations under
the Utah Code that have had the problem of whether an employee who is also an officer is entitled to
compensation when discharged as an employee but
retains his position as an officer. The analogy above
cited, as well as the one set forth in AMJ, however,
should be helpful. For example, in the AMJ citation
above cited it stated as follows:
"While the status of an officer of a corporation as an 'employee' thereof within the
meaning of the Social Security and Unemployment Insurance Acts often presents a difficult
problem, it seems clear that under both the
Federal and State acts the mere fact that one
is an officer or has an interest in the business,
corporation, or firm alleged to come within
the operation of the acts, does not itself preclude such person from being an employee
within the meaning of the acts. In fact, the
Federal and some of state a~ts provided that
the term 'employee' includes an officer of a
corporation."

I regret that I have not more citations to present, however, this type case does not seem to have
been decided before. The mere fact that it hasn't
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been decided before, would not seem to me to
preclude a decision that is necessary and essential
to persons such as I who are being taken advantage
of by state agencies. If we are employees for one
purpose we are employees for another purpose. It
seems consistent that if they desire to require the
employer to pay unemployment compensation on officers who also serve in a dual capacity as en1ployees, it is only fair and consistent to pay unemployment compensation when that same person is
unemployed as an employee, even though he is not
unemployed as an officer. To hold otherwise would
be to authorize a form of penalty or taxation contrary to what the legislature intended when it enacted the law. It would seem ~that within the definitions of employment stated in Utah Code Annotated
35-4-22 that Ralph Child Construction Company
constitutes an employing unit and Ralph E. Child
himself as manager constitutes an employee.
I respectfully urge the court to consider the
circumstance and to render a judgment ·either allowing the unemployment compensation remanded
or requiring a refund of the unemployment conlpensation insurance collected. It seems that one or
the other is mandatory.
Respectfully submitted,
RALPH E. CHILD
Appellant
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